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Understanding Nietzsche’s perspectivism and reconciling it with perspectival realism 
Abstract: Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche often suggest that he is some form of anti-realist, 
i.e. he does not affirm objective scientific truth or understanding of the world. Nietzsche 
advocates a viewpoint known as perspectivism, which may seem to cement this anti-realist 
interpretation, insofar as it emphasises the perspectival nature of understanding. Similarly, Justin 
Remhof interprets Nietzsche as an object constructivist, i.e. that objects within the world are 
constructed by human concepts, and this also seems to align neatly with anti-realist 
interpretations. This essay will show how both Nietzsche’s perspectivism and object 
constructivism are compatible with a realist understanding of the world, in relation to a position 
known as perspectival realism. Furthermore, this essay will clarify the exact ‘world’ that 
Nietzsche believes one can understand, as the non-transcendent world of appearance.  
Within Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche writes that “There is only a perspective seeing, only a 
perspective ‘knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more 
complete will our ‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’ be”.1 This quotation serves as the 
basis for a viewpoint known as perspectivism, which is the epistemic position that all 
knowledge or understanding is from some particular point of view or interpretation. This 
precludes objective understanding, and thus brings it into conflict with scientific realism; the 
view that scientific claims can deliver objective and mind-independent truths regarding the 
world, i.e. truths that exist irrespective of human activity. Another view point typically held in 
opposition with scientific realism is constructivism, which, broadly, is the view that scientific 
knowledge it to some extent produced by the interactions and practices of human beings. If 
knowledge is neither objective nor mind-independent, then this is commonly held to entail an 
anti-realist position. This essay will contrast Justin Remhof’s constructivist account of 
Nietzsche and Brian Leiter’s empiricist perspectivist interpretation, highlight the tension 
between them, and set forth my own interpretation which develops a constructivist position 
which accommodates aspects of both. During the second half of the essay, I will show that my 
interpretation of Nietzsche is compatible with a scientific realist position, by demonstrating its 
overlap with a view known as perspectival realism. I will argue that Michela Massimi’s 
perspectival realism shows how perspectivists can attain non-relativistic truth regarding the 
																																																						
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufman & R.J. Hollingdale, 
(USA, Vintage Books, 1969), III, 12 
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world, and can, in fact, be committed to the basic realist tenet of understanding reality. Finally, 
I will argue that ‘reality’, for Nietzsche, is a non-transcendent world of appearance.  
 
Constructivism about objects  
Before considering perspectivism, I begin with Justin Remhof’s argument that Nietzsche is a 
constructivist about objects. This is the view that all objects are socially constructed, “the 
existence of all objects we can encounter, such as rocks, trees, and planets, depends essentially 
on the application of concepts to the world relative to our needs, interests, and values”.2 
Remhof’s argument is as follows: 
1)  Only bundles of forces exist 
2) If so, then if objects exist, they are identical to unified bundles of forces.  
3) Objects exist.  
4) So, objects are identical to unified bundles of forces.  
 
Thus far, the argument is exploiting Nietzsche’s will to power as the fundamental ontology of 
reality, i.e. all reality consists of power relations or forces (“the world viewed from 
inside…would be ‘will to power’ and nothing else”, and “we live in a world whose essence is 
will to power”).3 Further evidence that Nietzsche believes that forces are the fundamental 
entities of reality is his support for physicist Roger Boscovich who advocates this view.4  
 
The following premises, however, are more contentious:  
5) Bundles of forces are unified by virtue of human practices.  
6) So, objects are identical to bundles of forces unified by virtue of human practices.  
7) If so, then human practices bring all objects into existence. 
8) So, human practices bring all objects into existence.5  
																																																						
2 Justin Remhof, ‘Defending Nietzsche’s Constructivism about Objects’, European Journal of 
Philosophy, 25:4, (2017) pp. 1132-1158 p. 1132 
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Marion Faber, (USA: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 36 and 186 
4 ibid., 12 and, 
 Op. cit., Remhof, p. 1140  
5 Op. cit., Remhof, p. 1133 
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Textual evidence  
In defence of 5, Remhof quotes KSA 13:14 (98): “A ‘thing’ is the sum of its effects, 
synthetically unified by a concept”.6 This suggests that to be a ‘thing’, the application of a 
concept is required. Since applying concepts is a human practice, then human practices are 
requisite for the existence of ‘things’. Since a ‘thing’ here stands for objects within the world, 
then one can derive premise 6 that objects are unified through human practices. The “effects” 
that a thing has within the world consists of its empirical properties. The effects are therefore 
“synthetically united” insofar as the empirical properties are organised, i.e. human beings 
interpret their sensory experience, the interactions of bundles of forces, with some organisation, 
and this provides the ‘unity’ which gives rise to an object.7  
Regarding 7 and 8, one may enquire in what ontological sense the objects are brought 
into existence, e.g. physically, conceptually?  Remhof writes that the existence of objects 
depends upon stipulated identity conditions, and such conditions presuppose conceptualisation. 
He derives this from KSA 12:2 (77): “A thing = its qualities; but these equal everything which 
matters to us about that thing; a unity under which we collect the relations that may be of some 
account to us”.8 Again, according to Remhof, ‘thing’ stands for object, and the thing’s 
“qualities” are precisely the identity conditions stipulated by a given concept. Furthermore, 
construction of objects is empirically constrained insofar as objects are orderings of bundles of 
forces (empirical properties of the world). As such, objects consist of things that are already 
ontologically present within the world. Remhof’s own example concerns planets; the empirical 
properties or things which constitute planets already exist within the world, but ‘planets’ only 
exist once human beings create the concept of a ‘planet’ with particular identity conditions, 
which organise particular empirical properties.9 Objects are constructions insofar as they are 
conceptual organisations of empirical properties, and without human practices to conduct such 
organisation, they would not exist.10  
 
																																																						
6 ibid., p. 1134 
7 ibid., p. 1135 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid., p. 1136  
10 I intend to establish Nietzsche’s view, without supposing that constructivism itself is a 
coherent position.  
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Assessing textual evidence 
Two primary considerations should be upheld when assessing source material from Nietzsche’s 
work. Firstly, whether or not the material is derived from his published work. The unpublished 
material gathered subsequent to Nietzsche’s mental collapse is known as the Nachlass, and its 
usage is controversial. One reason is that one cannot be sure that Nietzsche ever intended to 
publish it, and may have rejected its content. As such, Hollingdale proposes that any material 
within the Nachlass that finds no parallel within the published material is simply invalid as 
evidence for Nietzsche’s thought.11 This approach may seem severe, but Hollingdale defends 
it on the grounds that Nietzsche was a proponent of “experimental philosophy”, i.e. trying out 
different points of view (indeed, this is a central aspect of his perspectivism). By experimenting 
with various ideas, one may entertain notions with which one disagrees.12 Supposing that 
Nietzsche may try this approach in his notes, then all unpublished material demands a sceptical 
approach as prescribed by Hollingdale.  
The second consideration is the publication date since it is widely agreed that 
Nietzsche’s thinking regarding truth developed throughout his writings. Clark divides his work 
into a first phase, a second (beginning in the 1880s), and a third (beginning in 1887 with 
Genealogy).13 She argues that beginning with the second phase, he rejects the Kantian 
distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves, i.e. the separation between how the 
world appears to human beings and how the world really is in-itself. In the final phase, 
Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer’s falsification thesis – that our knowledge of the world is 
necessarily false.14 This latter principle follows from the distinction between appearances and 
things-in-themselves insofar as reality itself is therefore unknowable. Thus, to reject this 
distinction undermines Schopenhauer’s thesis. Clark therefore argues that Nietzsche eventually 
accepts the possibility of non-metaphysical truth, whilst in his earlier philosophy, he assumed 
																																																						
11 R.J. Hollingdale, Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy, (USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) p.222   
12 ibid., p. 223 
13 Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, (USA: Cambridge University Press, 
1990) p. 22 
14 ibid., See chapters 1-4 
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that all truth was metaphysical.15 Assuming that this analysis is at least broadly correct, it 
implies that any references to Nietzsche’s early work may not reflect his later ‘mature’ thought.  
Applying these considerations to Remhof’s textual evidence, one is alerted by his use 
of Nachlass material for key quotes cited above. The above Nachlass quotes, KSA 12:2 77 and 
KSA, 13:14 98, derive from the 1885-7 and 1887-9 period, respectively. This places it within 
the middle to late period of Nietzsche’s writing, and thus the “mature period”, as argued by 
Clark. As such, writings from this period have a greater probability of corresponding to 
Nietzsche’s developed thought regarding truth. Following Hollingdale, the key step is to 
ascertain whether these Nachlass quotations have any parallel within the published material.   
Remhof does make numerous references to The Gay Science (1882), falling within the 
middle period of his writings, and Beyond Good and Evil, 1886, the late middle period of his 
writings. These include quotations that plausibly imply a constructivist viewpoint regarding 
objects. Consider Gay Science 57: “That mountain over there! That cloud over there! What is 
‘real’ about that? Subtract just once the phantasm and the whole human contribution from it, 
you sober ones! Yes, if you could do that! If you could forget your background, your past, your 
nursery school – all of your humanity and animality! There is no ‘reality’ for us – and not for 
you either, you sober ones.”16 Here, Nietzsche describes the “human contribution” regarding 
objects within the world, in particular, he emphasises the social background. Indeed, as Remhof 
notes, objects are constructed using concepts which presuppose the conditions of language, and 
insofar as language is a social phenomenon, then object construction occurs within the context 
of a community.17 Hence the notion that objects are socially constructed.  
Consider Gay Science 58: “The reputation, name, and appearance, the worth, the usual 
measure and weight of a thing…has, through the belief in it and its growth from generation to 
generation, slowly grown onto and into the thing and has become its very body”18 In this 
passage, Nietzsche describes the various ways in which things are conceptualised and notes 
how this conceptualisation “grows onto” the thing and has “becomes” the body of the thing. 
To further emphasise this, he finishes the passage with “let us also not forget that in the long 
run it is enough to create new names and valuations and appearances of truth in order to create 
																																																						
15 ibid. p. 22 
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff, (UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 57  
17 Op. cit., Remhof, p. 1135 
18 Op. cit., The Gay Science, 58  
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new things”.19 In another passage, he suggests that human beings create things according to 
their own concepts. “We are operating only with things that do not exist - with lines, surfaces, 
bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces. How is explanation to be at all possible when 
we first turn everything into a picture – our picture!”20 From these passages alone, one can 
therefore find evidence for a viewpoint that is seemingly consistent with the Nachlass 
quotations that Remhof provides indicating constructivism about objects. Thus, it seems that 
there is support for Remhof’s interpretation in Nietzsche’s published material. Moreover, this 
material belongs to what Clark would regard as Nietzsche’s second mature phase, and is thus 
within the confines of his mature thinking.  
 
A challenge to constructivism and a response  
Remhof’s account may face the following objection; Nietzsche rejects the existence of objects 
put forward by the metaphysical philosophical tradition (“errors” such as “enduring 
things…identical things”), but if Nietzsche is a constructivist, one may suppose that the very 
fact that the metaphysical tradition conceptualises these entities is sufficient to establish their 
existence.21 The tension here is that Nietzsche is asserting there not to be certain kinds of 
conceptualised objects in the world, yet the constructivist view states that conceptualisation 
brings objects into existence. Thus, Nietzsche’s constructivism is arguably inconsistent with 
his objections of metaphysical philosophy. In response, there is, as noted, an empiricist strain 
within Nietzsche such that objects are constructed from empirical properties. This entails that 
not just any object can be constructed. Metaphysics is criticised by Nietzsche, in part, because 
it has no grounding in empirical experience. As such, there is no contradiction for Nietzsche to 
regard objects as constructed, but to reject metaphysical objects.  
Remhof takes his constructivist interpretation to conclude that Nietzsche conceives of 
truth in a pragmatist fashion, i.e. that true propositions are determined by which provide 
practical benefits. He argues that the truth conditions of propositions will often depend upon 
objects within the world, whereby a proposition is true if it corresponds to real properties of 
																																																						
19 ibid. 
20 ibid., 112  
21 ibid., 110 
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these objects.22 However, if objects within the world are constructed, then aspects of objects 
are constructed, and it follows that truth conditions for propositions will also be constructed.23 
In other words, the truth of propositions regarding objects is conditional upon human activity 
in creating concepts which bring objects into existence. Since Nietzsche regards objects as 
constructed, then Nietzsche must regard the truth conditions of propositions as constructed. 
Human beings construct concepts according to their interests (all concerns from aiding one’s 
survival to manipulating one’s environment for convenience). Remhof finds the dependence 
on human interests and needs to overlap with the pragmatism of William James.24 Remhof 
paraphrases James; “a “thing” is something we “carve out” of sensory experience to “suit our 
human purposes,” such that “man engenders truth upon (the world).”25 The similarity between 
the two views thus leads Remhof to conclude that Nietzsche is a pragmatist regarding truth.  
This pragmatist position is in opposition to a correspondence conception of truth whereby true 
statements are those that correspond to mind-independent features of the world, i.e. aspects of 
the world that exist independent of human cognition of them. A basic requirement of scientific 
realism is that claims regarding the world are at least attempting to “get things right”, and thus, 
realism as understood presupposes a correspondence notion of truth.26 Remhof’s interpretation 
is therefore a serious challenge to any realist interpretation of Nietzsche. In order to salvage a 
realist interpretation of Nietzsche, I will show that this pragmatist interpretation is inadequate.  
 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism and empiricism 
At this juncture, I shall introduce Brian Leiter’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. 
He rejects what is called the ‘received view’ (RV) of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, to which he 
attributes the following claims: 
1) The world has no determinate nature or structure; 
																																																						
22 Justin Remhof, ‘Nietzsche’s Conception of Truth: Correspondence, Coherence, or 
Pragmatist?’, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 46:2, (Summer 2015), pp. 229-238 p. 231  
23 ibid., pp. 231-2 
24 ibid., p. 233  
25 Op. cit., ‘Nietzsche’s Conception of Truth’, p. 234  
26 Michela Massimi, ‘Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth’, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 96, No. 2, (Mar. 2018) pp. 342-359 p. 345 
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2) our theories or concepts do not “describe” or “correspond” to the world because it has 
no determinate character 
3) Our concepts and theories are “mere” interpretations or “mere” perspectives (reflecting 
pragmatic needs, at least on some accounts) 
4) No perspective can enjoy an epistemic privilege over any other, because there is no 
epistemically privileged mode of access to this characterless world.27 28 
Leiter accepts Clark’s thesis that later Nietzsche comes to accept the possibility of attaining 
truth as correspondence, as well as her distinction between a first, second and third stage of 
Nietzsche’s conception of truth, whereby the latter stages represent the culmination of his 
thinking.29 From the second stage, Nietzsche rejects the distinction between appearances and 
things-in-themselves. This is well supported, consider, for instance, “The ‘apparent’ world is 
the only real one” or “’knowledge in itself’...always demand that we should think of an eye 
that is completely unthinkable”. 30 By describing perspectives as “mere perspectives”, the RV 
suggests that perspectives are deficient because they do not provide understanding of reality as 
it really is, however, this presumes the distinction between appearances and things-in-
themselves which Nietzsche rejects. As such, the RV mischaracterises Nietzsche’s mature 
thinking. 
The other main charge that Leiter levels against the RV is that it fails to acknowledge 
that Nietzsche is an empiricist and, thus regards empirical perspectives as epistemically 
superior. Empiricists hold that sensory experience is the basis for all knowledge. Nietzsche 
writes that “All credibility, all good conscience, all evidence of truth come only from the 
																																																						
27 Brian Leiter, ‘Perspectivism in Genealogy of Morals’, in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: 
Essays on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard Schacht, (USA: University of 
California Press, 1994) pp. 334-358 p. 334 
28 Remhof himself certainly accepts points 1-3 as interpretations of Nietzsche, although, he 
would likely accept 2 on the grounds that propositions cannot correspond to the world because 
objects are constructed, and do not therefore correspond to the world.  
29 Op. cit., Leiter, p. 335  
30 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. Duncan Large, (USA: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), III, 2 (This falls at the end of the third stage of Nietzsche’s writings), and,  
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufman & R.J. Hollingdale, 
(USA, Vintage Books, 1969), III, 12 
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senses.”31 Consider also; “We possess science nowadays precisely to the extent that we accept 
the evidence of the senses…the rest is abortion and not yet science: to wit, metaphysics, 
theology, psychology, theory of knowledge….reality is nowhere to be found in them”.32 As 
Leiter notes, this passage is not merely distinguishing between good and bad science, but 
upholding the former on the grounds that it is grounded in reality, in virtue of using empirical 
evidence.33 This same principle is invoked with his claim “in Christianity neither morality nor 
religion come into contact with reality at any point”.34 On this evidence, it seems that Nietzsche 
clearly regards certain perspectives to possess greater “epistemic merits” than others, i.e. 
aspects that pertain to a perspective as a basis for knowledge or understanding.35 Leiter thus 
rejects 4 of the RV.   
 
Against the pragmatist interpretation 
I argue that the failure to acknowledge Nietzsche’s empiricism also applies to Remhof’s 
pragmatist interpretation. As shown, Remhof describes how construction of objects is 
empirically constrained by sensory properties within the world, but he nonetheless concludes 
that objects themselves reflect human interests, and therefore regards Nietzsche as a pragmatist. 
This interpretation is inadequate with regard to Nietzsche’s empiricist claims. If human 
interests are the key basis for truth, then this is inconsistent with attempts to understand reality. 
Truth defined according to human interests is detached from truth as defined by actual 
properties of reality. Indeed, Nietzsche distinguishes between true or false beliefs and useful 
beliefs; “Through immense periods of time, the intellect produced nothing but errors; some of 
them turned out to be useful and species preserving”.36 According to a pragmatist 
interpretation, there would be no such separation between truth and usefulness, since the former 
is defined in terms of the latter. Consider also; “Life is not an argument. – We have arranged 
																																																						
31 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1973), 134. All further references to Beyond Good are to the Faber translation. 
32 Op. cit., Twilight of the Idols, III, 3  
33 Op. cit., Leiter, p. 337  
34 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, (UK: 
Penguin Books, 1990), 15  
35 Op. cit., Leiter, p. 336  
36 Op. cit., Gay Science, 110  
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for ourselves a world in which we are able to live – by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes 
and effects, motion and rest…without these articles of faith no one could endure living! But 
that does not prove them…the conditions of life might include error.”37 Again, Nietzsche 
describes ideas without which survival itself would be impossible. Yet, even these (one must 
say highly useful) ideas are not therefore true. This suggests that Nietzsche defines truth by 
some criterion besides usefulness, and is therefore not a pragmatist.38  
 
Leiter on Nietzsche’s perspectivism 
Leiter presents a passage from Genealogy (published at the start of Nietzsche’s third and most 
mature period), in which Nietzsche writes that objectivity should be “understood not as 
contemplation without interest (which is a nonsensical absurdity) but the ability to control 
one’s pro and con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a variety of 
perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge”. Nietzsche continues to 
describe how former concepts such as “pure reason” and “knowledge in itself” presumed the 
impossibility of “an eye turned in no particular direction”, i.e. a standpoint in which the subject 
offers no interpretation. On the contrary, he writes that; “There is only a perspective seeing, 
only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more 
complete will our ‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’ be”.39 This passage clearly expresses 
epistemic perspectivism, i.e. all knowledge is necessarily perspectival, (from some particular 
standpoint and thus non-objective). Leiter also interprets this as the suggestion that human 
practices are a condition of understanding, insofar as Nietzsche holds that an interpretation 
presupposes language which presupposes a community (Remhof accepts this point).40 
However, human interests do not constitute this knowledge.41 This is because Nietzsche is 
evidently committed to understanding the world empirically, from sensory experience, which 
																																																						
37 ibid., 121  
38As the above quotes show, Nietzsche does nonetheless make seemingly pragmatist 
insinuations to the ‘usefulness’ of ideas. But, importantly, he does not define truth in terms of 
usefulness.  
39 Op. cit., On the Genealogy of Morals, III, 12 
40 Op. cit., Leiter, p. 349 
41 ibid., p. 350 
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he believes connects one with reality. This is important if one maintains that he is a realist 
committed to understanding.  
Knowing, Leiter argues, bears similarities with seeing in that both depend upon 
perspectives. Through consideration of this analogy with sight, he derives the following claims 
regarding Nietzsche’s perspectives. The perspectivism claim - that one can know an object 
from a particular perspective.42 The plurality claim - the more perspectives that one employs, 
the greater one’s understanding of an object.43 The purity claim – certain perspectives will 
distort our understanding of an object.44 A typical realist understanding of the world advocates 
the semantic thesis; that claims regarding the world are objectively true or false. Evidently, 
such an approach is impossible according to Nietzsche, since all of human understanding 
presupposes some perspective. Insofar as Nietzsche regards empirically based perspectives to 
be superior to non-empirically based perspectives, then his perspectivism is certainly not 
relativist, i.e. it does not propose that all perspectives are equal. Nonetheless, it is not yet clear 
how this coheres with a realist interpretation. In the above passage, he redefines objectivity as 
the ability to employ a variety of perspectives regarding a given object. This therefore seems 
to conflict with a conventional realist approach. I will soon consider the importance of the 
plurality claim, and how this can be reconciled with a realist approach, but firstly, I will show 
how Nietzsche’s perspectivism relates to the constructivist interpretation. According to Leiter’s 
interpretation, Nietzsche seems to be positing that one can come to some understanding 
regarding the world (and thus objects within the world), but one may ask how this could be 
consistent with a constructivist interpretation in which, objects are products of human activity. 
One may argue that this entails that understanding can correspond with mere human 
constructions.  
 
How to reconcile this with the view that objects are constructed?  
I maintain that Remhof’s constructivist interpretation overlooks the extent of Nietzsche’s 
empiricism. Within Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes; “Concepts are more or less 
precise figurative signs for frequently recurring and simultaneous sensations, for groups of 
																																																						
42 ibid., p. 345 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid., p. 346 
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sensations”.45 In this extract, Nietzsche describes concepts as “signs” in the sense of a signifier 
for sensations in the world. This sense of the term ‘concept’ carries the suggestion that concepts 
have the role of representing things within the world. Remhof himself summarises concepts as 
a means to “organise empirical properties”.46 Considering Nietzsche’s already established 
empiricism, I maintain that objects should be understood as the organised units of empirical 
sensations within the world, and such organisation occurs in virtue of concepts. Organising 
experience is a mediation that human beings have with the world, rather than constitutive of 
the world. Objects are created, but not as fictional entities belonging to the human imagination. 
On the contrary, objects are the labels or categorisations that human beings give to their 
experience of the world, and they consist of empirical properties within the world. The term 
‘construction’ remains appropriate since, according to Nietzsche, an ‘object’ still requires some 
human addition, i.e. all conceptualisation rests on the condition of human practices. Regarding 
the question ‘Are objects real?’, one must therefore give a qualified response. The category of 
an object requires human practices, yet the things in which objects consist belong to reality, 
independent of human beings. Similarly, with regard to the mammal category within biology, 
the category itself is arguably a construction insofar there is no precise mammal kind in the 
world, rather, a ‘mammal’ is a concept for grouping particular biological properties of 
organisms, e.g. grouping animals together that possess mammary glands, hair, etc.47 This 
emphasises Nietzsche’s empiricist commitment whilst acknowledging human construction.  
 
Interaction between perspectives 
As already shown, constructivism is conditional on a social community. Remhof cites Gay 
Science; “consciousness actually belongs not to man’s existence as an individual but rather to 
the community – and herd aspects of his nature”.48 If conceptualisation requires language, and 
language presupposes a community (since Nietzsche believes there are no solitary language 
users), then concept formation also presupposes a community. Leiter makes a similar point 
with regard to perspectives. Indeed, if perspectives are interpretations of the world then 
arguably concepts are microcosms of perspectives. Presuming that concepts fall within the 
																																																						
45 Op. cit., Beyond Good and Evil, 268 
46 Op. cit., ‘Defending Nietzsche’s Constructivism…’, p. 1134 
47 This example is merely an illustration, though it is accepted by some.  
48 Op. cit., The Gay Science, 354 
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scope of perspectives, then henceforth I shall use ‘perspective’ as an encompassing term which 
includes concepts.  Within a social community, human beings hold both language in common 
and certain perspectives which effect how they experience the world. Shared perspectives 
(encompassing concepts) can construct objects and thus provide objects in common. However, 
a perspective does not entirely constitute the object, and thus Nietzsche states that “using the 
same word is not enough to ensure mutual understanding: we must also use the same words for 
the same inner category of inner experiences; ultimately, we must have the same experiences 
in common” (emphasis my own).49 Once again, Nietzsche emphasises sensory experience for 
attaining understanding.  
Arguably, new perspectives could form which provide differing interpretations of 
objects held in common. This supposes a broad differentiation between background 
perspectives, which provide the conditional framework, and working perspectives, which 
operate within the framework provided by the former type. Scientific theories, for instance, 
could provide both background and working perspectives, insofar as objects formed by science 
now form an essential place within the understanding of the world e.g. atoms and planets. 
Against these background perspectives, further scientific perspectives can develop which 
elaborate on and refine understanding of these objects. The important point is to show how 
perspectives can both construct objects, and interact with other perspectives.   
 
The basis for plurality  
Leiter’s perspectival claim holds that, for Nietzsche, our experience and knowledge of the 
world is fundamentally perspectival. So, our only access to the world is through perspectives.   
Following from Leiter’s purity claim, some perspectives can be inaccurate or wrong, i.e. 
assuming a correspondence view, then some perspectives more closely correspond to objects 
in the world than others. Indeed, Nietzsche claims that one must not only employ perspectives, 
but also “dispose of them”, to attain understanding.50 One may object that if all understanding 
is perspectival, and derives from sensory experience, then a perspective regarding one’s 
experience is infallible. If one’s perspective is a mere description of one’s experiences, then it 
seems that whatever one’s perspective, this will be accurate for that particular individual. This 
																																																						
49 Op. cit., Beyond Good and Evil, 268 
50 Op. cit., Genealogy of Morals, III, 12 
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therefore seems to entail a form of Protagorean relativism in which truth depends upon one’s 
perspective.  
For Nietzsche, a perspective (via concepts) is a way of interpreting or organising one’s 
experience, and interpretations can be inaccurate. Nietzsche clearly regards certain 
interpretations of experience to be incorrect;  “If you’ll forgive me, an old philologist who can’t 
give up the wickedness of pointing out examples of bad interpretative practice, the ‘lawfulness 
of nature’ that physicists speak about so proudly, as if…this only exists by grace of your 
interpretations…it is not a factual matter…but rather no more than a naïve humanitarian 
concoction”.51 Here, we find him describing a certain scientific interpretation as bad, primarily 
because it is not a “factual matter”, i.e. the world is not in fact lawful. This suggests that 
Nietzsche is open to the possibility both that there are facts, and that one can know them. If 
not, then he could not state that natural laws are not facts. Further evidence is found in Twilight; 
“Heraclitus, too, did the senses an injustice. They do not lie either in the way that the Eleatics 
believe, or as he believed – they do not lie at all. What we make of their evidence is what gives 
rise to the lie, for example the lie of unity, the lie of materiality, of substance, of 
duration…‘Reason’ is what causes us to falsify the evidence of the senses”.52 Once again, we 
have the suggestion that certain interpretations can be incorrect, but also that the senses 
themselves show the world faithfully (“they do not lie” entails that they only provide truth). 
Falsity arises only through bad interpretations (“what we make”) of sensory experience. Since 
interpretations are fallible, then one can interpret experience falsely, and thus the Protagorean 
relativist objection to Nietzsche is untenable. Evidently, since Nietzsche rejects the notion of a 
transcendent reality-in-itself, then the world of appearance is the only reality.53 The senses 
therefore display reality faithfully, but are distorted by interpretations.  
Since perspectives can be wrong, then one must acquire perspectives and determine the 
most accurate, which requires comparisons. Nietzsche supports this point when discussing 
problematic moral systems; “precisely because the moral philosophers knew moral facta only 
roughly…knew them as them as the morality of their neighbourhood, say, or of their class, 
their Church, the Zeitgeist, their climate or region…they never did catch sight of the real 
																																																						
51 Op. cit., Beyond Good and Evil, 22 
52 Op. cit., Twilight of the Idols, III, 2 
53 Appearances can deceive since one may interpret experience inaccurately, but ‘reality 
itself’ is nonetheless the world of appearances rather than a transcendent reality-in-itself. 
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problems of morality – all of which come to light only be comparing many moralities”.54 
Through opening ourselves to many perspectives, it allows perspectives to collide, and thus the 
problems of each, which would otherwise remain obscured, to be exposed. Though Nietzsche 
accepts that some perspectives can be superior to others, the problem remains of how to 
establish which perspectives are superior and thereby derive understanding of the world in a 
realist fashion.  
 
Perspectival realism   
Perspectival realism is an approach derived from realism vs anti-realism debates within 
philosophy of science. Coined by Ron Giere, it originated as an attempt to steer a path between 
what is deemed an untenable strong realist viewpoint, whereby scientific claims are considered 
to be objectively true and correspond to mind-independent features of the world, with an 
opposing anti-realist viewpoint in which it is broadly argued that there are “no joints at which 
nature can be carved”, no objective truth to scientific claims due to pernicious human interests, 
and no mind-independent facts.55 Perspectival realism claims that scientific theorising and 
modelling is perspective bound, and thus acknowledges the role of human interests within 
scientific theories, and with that; the impossibility of pure objectivity regarding scientific 
claims. These Kuhnian notions take their cue from a variety of arguments, such as the plurality 
of scientific viewpoints that often occur regarding the same phenomena. This has served to 
challenge the monist presumption that underlies the objectivist realist stance, i.e. that there 
must be one correct theory or model which corresponds to phenomena.  
Giere provides an example of observing the Washington Monument from various 
positions, each of which provide differing yet equally valid aspects of the obelisk.56 From each 
position, individuals will possess different perspectives and may make seemingly contradictory 
claims, insofar as the building may appear very different from, for instance, the base than from 
the Capital building.57 Yet, when these claims are placed within the context of their 
perspectives, there is no contradiction. It can be true that from the base, the Monument appears 
																																																						
54 Op. cit., Beyond Good and Evil, 186 
55 Michela Massimi, ‘Bringing Real Realism Back Home’, in The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher, 
eds. Mark Couch & Jessica Pfeifer, (USA: Oxford University Press, 2016) pp. 98-120 p. 99 
56 Ronald Giere, Scientific Perspectivism, (USA: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 13 
57 ibid. 
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one way, whilst from the Capital building, it appears to be entirely different. This offers another 
potential basis for Nietzsche’s claim that one must gather various perspectives to attain 
understanding of an object; multiple perspectives can sometimes provide differing yet true 
evaluations of a given object, and thus acquiring many perspectives can provide greater 
understanding of that object. Both Nietzsche and perspectival realists therefore accept 
pluralism; the tenet that understanding is not acquired from a single viewpoint, but that the 
most complete understanding must take in to consideration as many valid perspectives as 
possible. Some perspectival realists do nonetheless maintain that there are mind-independent 
states of affairs within the world. This essay will focus on Michela Massimi’s perspectival 
realism, which regards knowledge claims as perspectival yet which attempts to show how 
perspectives can attain some form of perspective (or mind) independent understanding.58 
 
Is perspectival realism relevant to Nietzsche?   
Massimi regards her approach as realist insofar as it aspires to the “minimal realist 
commitment” which is “getting things right”, i.e. acquiring truth regarding the world.59 Any 
approach that disposes of this commitment is not a plausible candidate for realism. This leads 
us back to the challenge to regarding Nietzsche as a realist. To recap, his constructivism holds 
that concepts form objects through organisations of empirical sensations, sensations are aspects 
or properties of reality, and thus objects consist of properties of reality. Properties become 
objects when unified in a particular way. To attempt to understand objects is to attempt to 
understand reality, for Nietzsche, as objects are merely the necessarily human ways in which 
human beings organise their experience of the world. The ‘things’ that underlie the objects are 
constantly present and belong to the natural world. Further, I have shown Nietzsche rejects 
certain perspectives for not being “factual”, and consistent with his empiricism, he claims that 
the senses “do not lie”.60 This all suggests that he is committed to truth or “getting things right” 
regarding reality, as opposed to a pragmatist or anti-realist position.  
 Nietzsche describes the proper approach to one’s sensory experience in highly 
scientific terms during a passage in which he criticises the credulousness of those who have 
undergone religious experiences; 
																																																						
58 Op. cit., ‘Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth’, p. 343 
59 ibid., p. 345  
60 Op. cit., Twilight of the Idols, III, 2 
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“What did I really experience? What was going on inside and around me? Was my reason 
bright enough? Was my will turned against all deceptions of the senses and stalwart in warding 
off the fantastic?’ None of them has asked such questions…But we, we others, we reason-
thirsty ones, want to face our experiences as sternly as we would a scientific experiment, hour 
by hour, day by day! We want to be our own experiments and guinea-pigs”.61  
 
This extract shows that, for Nietzsche, understanding is best attained through a scientific 
approach. He is an empiricist, and science is the highest culmination of empirical theorising. 
He writes; “We possess science nowadays precisely to the extent that we decided to accept the 
evidence of the senses”.62 The connection, therefore, between Nietzsche’s approach and 
perspectival realism regarding science is not trivial, but worthy of serious consideration.   
 
Perspectival truth  
Now, one can return to the problem previously raised regarding to move from perspectives to 
understanding regarding the world. Although Nietzsche suggests endorses a plurality of 
perspectives regarding a given object within the world, and accepts that some can be superior 
to others, it remains unclear, firstly, how to reliably compare between perspectives insofar as 
there are no perspective independent means of comparison, i.e. one is always judging from a 
particular perspective, and secondly, how to judge that a particular perspective should be 
rejected. Without any clear standards in place, it remains the case that a perspectival approach 
simply permits differing interpretations to make claims that contradict other interpretations, 
whereby each is true according to that particular perspective. This could again entail a form of 
relativism regarding truth, i.e. truth is not objective but relative to perspectives. If so, then it 
does not meet the realist requirement of “getting things right” regarding the world, rather, 
something is true merely because it meets the truth values of a perspective.  
Michela Massimi has attempted a solution to this problem. She begins with an analysis 
of differing notions of perspectival truth, and rejects the idea that perspectival truth is relative 
to a given perspective. On the contrary, she argues that the perspectivist can uphold the realist 
notion of truth as corresponding to perspective-independent entities and states of affairs. 
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Massimi accepts that if truth values simply vary across perspectives then this does indeed entail 
a form of relativised truth. Moreover, this notion of perspectival truth cannot be committed to 
realism because it merely states what is the case from a given perspective, without commitment 
to getting things right in the world.63 Neither the claim “In the Ptolemaic perspective, the earth 
is not orbiting the sun” or the claim “In the Copernican perspective, the earth is orbiting the 
sun” are committal regarding the actual orbit of the sun.64 A commitment to understanding 
actual states of affairs is a prerequisite of a realist position, and therefore this notion of 
perspectival truth is inadequate.  
A more promising way forward, she suggests, begins with the notion of scientific 
perspectives as providing truth conditions or “contexts of use” for scientific claims. 65 A claim 
is therefore true according to the particular context of use provided by a given scientific 
perspective. Contexts of use includes the relevant circumstances for truth or falsity, e.g.  if 
attempting to study water then ‘‘If the purpose is to construct models of fluid flow, the 
principles of fluid mechanics, which treat water as a continuous fluid, generate by far the best 
fitting models. But if our purpose is to understand diffusion in a fluid, we must turn to the 
principles of statistical mechanics applied to molecules.’’66 Defining perspectival truth as 
dependent on perspectival contexts of use allows for claims to refer to the world since 
perspectives postulate conditions for truth, and such conditions can relate to an independent 
world, rather than being true merely in virtue of belonging to a particular perspective. Yet, this 
does not resolve the issue of establishing which perspectives are superior.  
 
Standards of performance adequacy 
Massimi adds a significant qualifying condition to perspectival truth: truth conditions of 
scientific claims depend upon the particular contexts of use within scientific perspective, but 
“such knowledge claims must also be assessable from the point of view of other (subsequent 
or rival) scientific perspectives”.67 This condition is the “context of assessment”, in which an 
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individual can cross between differing perspectives, and translate terms from one perspective 
to another. Claims would not straightforwardly contradict each other if one recognises how 
they rely on differing truth conditions. Significantly, a context of assessment allows 
comparison and evaluation of differing perspectives according to standards that hold across 
perspectives. Massimi describes these as “standards of performance adequacy”.68 These 
include “accuracy”, “empirical testability”, “projectibility”, and “heuristic fruitfulness”.69 The 
latter two refer to the possibilities offered by a claim or theory for further understanding. 
Differing perspectives may define these assessment standards somewhat differently, but these 
standards are sufficiently broad such that they hold across perspectives for cross-perspectival 
assessment. Moreover, they are empirically rigorous standards of assessment to which any 
empirically committed perspective arguably should be committed.  
One can apply this to the reasons cited for Nietzsche’s pluralism. Determining superior 
perspectives presupposes moving between perspectives, and establishing some means of 
assessment. This is rendered possible by the conjunction of contexts of use for translation 
between perspectives, and standards of performance adequacy within contexts of assessment. 
Standards of performance adequacy belong neatly within Nietzsche’s empiricist outlook. He 
understands the empiricist commitment as the requirement to apply stern standards of 
testability and accuracy to all experiences. Indeed, Leiter writes that truth, for Nietzsche, “must 
be established on other grounds: for example, empirical adequacy, explanatory potency, 
coherence, and the like”, which overlaps neatly with the standards of performance adequacy 
specified by Massimi.70 Nietzsche’s superior perspectives will be committed to empiricism, 
and will thereby hold in common the empirical standards of assessment stipulated above. These 
can provide cross-perspectival assessment, and determine the most successful or empirically 
adequate perspectives.  
If the claims of a given perspective continuously meet standards of performance 
adequacy, then one may conclude that they are successful or adequate. Importantly, the success 
of a given perspective must ideally be established using these standards by multiple other 
perspectives. Cross-perspectival assessment allows for a greater assortment of information to 
compare, and to better judge to what extent certain claims and evidence are consistent across 
perspectives. But it also helps to avoid circularity in which a single perspective is validated on 
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its own grounds.71 Nietzsche’s idea of objectivity, which Leiter refers to as “modest 
objectivity”, is similarly pointing out the need to acknowledge perspectives besides one’s own 
regarding a given object.72  
 
Inferring truth  
For Massimi, by establishing success or performance adequacy, one is in a position to infer 
that the claim in some way reflects mind-independent aspects of reality or is “getting things 
right”. This inference from perspectival claims to how things are in the world is a central 
presupposition within the argument. It involves an inference to the best explanation; if a given 
knowledge claim is established to be empirically adequate (i.e. accurate with its claims, 
consistent with claims of other successful perspectives, etc.), then the best explanation for this 
success is that the claim in some way reflects or corresponds to aspects of the mind-independent 
world.73 The counter suggestion that certain scientific claims could possess such success across 
perspectives whilst being false (not corresponding to reality), seems highly improbable. 
Massimi thus argues that we can acquire mind-independent knowledge of the world from 
within a perspectival approach. This knowledge refers to reality as it is in itself, i.e. reality 
beyond appearances. However, it has been shown that Nietzsche rejects the distinction between 
appearances and things-in-themselves assumed by Massimi.74 As such, it must be established 
precisely what reality Nietzsche intends to understand.  
 
Mind-independent truth within Nietzsche’s reality 
As shown, Nietzsche rejects the distinction between things in themselves and appearances, and 
regards the reality of appearances to be the sole reality. Indeed, this is integral to his 
empiricism. Insofar as the reality of appearances is the only reality, then to understand reality, 
one must assess how things appear, i.e. one’s sensory experience of the world. To Nietzsche, 
the world of appearances is the world. It is mind-independent insofar as Nietzsche accepts that 
it exists independent of human minds, however, he would refrain from the description ‘reality 
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in itself’ since this again presumes the opposition with appearances which he rejects. Even 
when perspectives regarding sense experience are wrong, this is not because there is something 
‘beyond’ or transcending the senses, but because the perspective itself is an interpretation of 
the experience which is in some way inadequate or distorting (…“what we make of their (the 
sense’s) evidence is what gives rise to the lie”).75 If one were to acquire a true perspective of 
sense experience, one would possess understanding that was always present within 
appearances, hence Nietzsche’s claim that the “senses do not lie”.76  
Such a perspective is true, akin to Massimi’s account, because it corresponds with 
reality, yet the point of difference is that reality is closer to home for Nietzsche. Massimi’s 
account of perspectival truth through contexts of use and contexts of assessment provides a 
way of reconciling the perspectival view with the realist aim of “getting things right”. 
Nietzsche’s views are inconsistent with this account only in regard to which “things” one is 
attempting to get right; for him, such things are not transcendent, but are available to us directly 
through the senses. One comes to know “the thing itself (not in itself)”.77 Applying Massimi’s 
account to Nietzsche’s, then one could compare perspectives using a context of assessment to 
determine if and which perspectives make empirically adequate claims. If shown to be 
successful, then Nietzsche could follow Massimi and infer from success to correspondence 
with reality, but in which ‘reality’ is the non-transcendent world of appearances.  
As established, “All knowing is perspectival”, and thus Nietzsche would reject with 
Massimi’s attempt to attain mind or perspective-independent knowledge.78 There is simply no 
escaping the perspectival nature of human interaction with the world. However, this is 
unproblematic if perspectives are interpretations of sense experience, and sense experience 
itself is sufficient to access reality.79 If an interpretation of sense experience is accurate, then 
this gives direct understanding of reality whilst being perspectival. To be constrained within a 
perspective, therefore, does not preclude access to reality. Perspectival knowledge, on this 
view, would not be inferior, for Nietzsche, to metaphysical knowledge whereby one has 
objective and perspective-independent understanding of the world. The former is the only 
attainable knowledge. Moreover, the inference from success to correspondence with reality is 
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a much smaller leap for Nietzsche than Massimi, since the move from interpretations of 
appearances to an apt interpretation of appearance would be less contentious than the move 
from perspectival claims to conclusions regarding non-perspectival aspects of reality. Despite 
rejecting mind or perspective-independent truth, Nietzsche nonetheless maintains the basic 
realist commitment, as Massimi calls it, insofar as he is committed to “getting things right”.  
 
Conclusion 
I began with Remhof’s object constructivist interpretation, and showed how this position has 
good textual support. Remhof argues that Nietzsche’s constructivism entails pragmatism 
regarding truth. With support from Leiter, Nietzsche’s empiricism was emphasised, and the 
pragmatist interpretation was shown to be implausible. It was argued that Nietzsche does seem 
to be committed to truth in a typical realist sense as correspondence to reality, and I developed 
a constructivist position that attempted to show how perspectives can both construct objects 
within the world, whilst acknowledging that there is an independent reality. I argued that 
insofar as this construction consists of organising empirical sensations within the world, then 
it is consistent with attempts to understand the world. Finally, I considered how Nietzsche 
dictum, that understanding requires gathering many perspectives, can be understood as both an 
advocacy of pluralism and the suggestion that one must compare multiple perspectives to 
establish which are superior. Massimi’s perspectival realist position offers a means of 
achieving this through contexts of assessment which allow comparison across perspectives 
using empirical standards to establish which perspectives are successful or empirically 
adequate. I argued that this is consistent with Nietzsche’s empiricist commitment and his 
perspectivism. Massimi infers from success or empirical adequacy of perspectives to their 
truth, and I argued that such a move would be an even smaller leap for Nietzsche insofar as 
truth, on his view, would be correspondence to a non-transcendent world of appearances, rather 
than a transcendent reality-in-itself. Since this includes a commitment to “getting things right”, 
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